Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1992

State of Utah v. Donald L. Jaeger : Petition for Writ
of Certiorari
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joan C. Watt; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorney for Respondent.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Christine F. Soltis; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Petitioner.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Utah v. Jaeger, No. 920139.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/4080

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

KFtl
.45.9
tS9
DOCKET NO.

BKttt-.

^ZO!^
IN

"^'ATF:

Lil-KKE COUh ' OF THE STATE OF UTAH

o r "m*ir,

:

PI. i in t i f f / P e t i t i o n e r ,
'i

' " > N A I I' '

:

o.

' •! r\ T -} n

:

IAMJRR,

<J 1-0/31
nn

:

Defendant/Respondent.

:

[ • ' r i o j . i t y No.

I!

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

R. PAUL VAN DAM (
Attorney General
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS (3039)
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone " * M 538-1022
At tor -..-yt :••.:•: Petitioner

JOAN C. WATT
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC,
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney foi Responu-. .t

FILE
MAR 1 7 1992
CLERK SUPREME COURT
UTAH

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plainti f f/Petitioner,

Case No.
Ct. App. No. 910132-CA

v.
DONALD L. JAEGER,
Defendant/Respondent.

Priority No. 13

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS (3039)
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1022
Attorneys for Petitioner

JOAN C. WATT
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

OPINION BELOW

2

JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

ARGUMENT
POINT I

BY SUMMARILY DISMISSING THE STATE'S APPEAL
CHALLENGING THE MAGISTRATE'S REFUSAL TO
BINDOVER AND DISMISSAL OF THE INFORMATION,
THE COURT OF APPEALS EFFECTIVELY DENIED THESTATE ANY AVENUE OF REVIEW OF THE
MAGISTRATE'S ACTIONS; THIS COURT SHOULD NOW
DETERMINE WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE METHOD OF
REVIEW OF AN ORDER DISMISSING AN INFORMATION
WHEN REFILING OF THE INFORMATION IS PRECLUDED
BY STATE V. BRICKEY

POINT II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED
THAT STATE V. HUMPHREY RULED ON THE SCOPE AND
NATURE OF THE STATE'S RIGHT TO SEEK REVIEW OF
A REFUSAL TO BINDOVER AND DISMISSAL OF AN
INFORMATION

13

POINT III IN ADDITION TO THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE, THIS
CASE PRESENTS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE OF STATE LAW
WHICH HAS NOT, BUT SHOULD BE, SETTLED BY THIS
COURT, THAT IS: IS PROBABLE CAUSE TO
BINDOVER ESTABLISHED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN
THE EVIDENCE, VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST
FAVORABLE TO THE INFORMATION, CREATES ISSUES
OF FACT AND CREDIBILITY TO BE RESOLVED BY A
JURY?

15

THE COURT OF APPEALS SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS WHEN IT SUMMARILY DISMISSED THE
STATE'S APPEAL THAT THIS COURT SHOULD
EXERCISE ITS POWER OF SUPERVISION BY
ACCEPTING REVIEW OF THE MATTER

18

POINT IV

CONCLUSION.

20

I

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Page
Commonwealth v. Finn. 496 A.2d 1254 (Pa. Sup. 1985)

10

Commonwealth v. Prado. 393 A.2d 8 (Penn. 1978)

11, 12

Cruz v. Mont ova. 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983)
Hunter v. District Court. 543 P.2d 1265 (Colo. 1975)

16
....

17

Matter of Buckner. 284 N.W.2d 507 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) . 17, 18
Morgan v. State. 675 P.2d 473 (Okl. App. 1984)

11

People in Interest of M.V.. 742 P.2d 326 (Colo. 1987) . . . .

18

People v. District Court. 803 P.2d 193 (Colo. 1990) ., . . 12, 17
People v. District Court. 803 P.2d 193 (Colo. 1990)

17

People v. Garner. 781 P.2d 87 (Colo. 1989)

17

People v. Mimms. 204 Cal.App.3d 471, 251 Cal.Rptr. 672 (Cal.
App. 1988)

12

People v. Moore. 446 N.W.2d 834 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989),
appeal denied

Mich.

(1990)

17

People v. Nevitt. 256 N.W.2d 612 (Mich. App. 1977)

11

People v. Pedrie. 727 P.2d 859 (Colo. 1986)

17

People v. Superior Court (BouldenU 257 Cal.Rptr. 678
(Calif. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1989)
People v. Superior Court (Kneipl, 268 Cal.Rptr. 1 (Cal.

17

Ct. App. 6 Dist. 1990)

17

State Ex Rel. Fallis v. Caldwell. 498 P.2d 426 (Okl. App. 1972)11
State ex rel. Funmaker v. Klamm. 317 N.W.2d 458 (Wis. 1982)17, 18
State v. Amador. 804 P.2d 1233 (Utah App. 1990)

7, 8

State v. Anderson. 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980)
16, 17
State v. Antes. 246 N.W.2d 671 (Wis. 1976)
10
State v. Brickev. 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986) . . 1, 4, 6, 9-11, 18

ii

State v. Donald L. Jaeger. No. 910132-CA (Utah App. January
7, 1992)

2, 5, 19

State v. Fahev. 275 N.W.2d 870 (S.D. 1979)

11

State v. Fry, 385 N.W.2d 196 (Wis. App. 1985)

10

State v. Gardiner. 814 P2d 568 (Utah 1991)

14, 19

State v. Humphrey. 794 P.2d 496 (Utah App. 1990)

5

State v. Humphrey. 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991) . 1, 5, 9, 13, 14, 19
State v. Kelbach. 569 P.2d 1100 (Utah 1977)

7

State v. Maki. 192 N.W.2d 811 (Minn. 1971)

12

State v. Patterson. 570 A.2d 174 (Conn. 1990)

17

State v. Ruiz. 678 P.2d 1109 (Idaho 1984)

11

State v. Zimmerman. 660 P.2d 960 (Kan. 1983)

. . . . . . . .

United States v. Eldredge, 13 P. 673 (Utah), cert, denied,
145 U.S. 636 (1887)
Walker v. Schneider. 477 N.W.2d 167 (N.D. 1991)

11
7
11

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES & RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990)

3

Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-3 (1980)

8

Utah Code Ann. § 77-10-3 (1978)

8

Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-7 (1978)

8

Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-9 (1978)

8

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1991)

7

Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-26 (1980)

7, 8

Utah Code Ann. § 77-39-4 (1978)

7

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-4 (1992)

3

Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2 (1992)

3, 9

Utah R. App. P. 10

19

Utah R. App. P. 46

12, 13, 15, 18, 20

Utah R. Crim. P. 7

8, 10

Utah R. Crim. P. 12

5
OTHER AUTHORITIES

Graham and Letwin, "The Preliminary Hearing in Los Angeles:
Some Field Findings and Legal Policy Observations," 18
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 635 (1971)

10

LaFave and Israel, Criminal Procedure. § 14.3

16

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Petitioner,

s

Case No.

v.

:

Ct. App. No. 910132-CA

DONALD L. JAEGER,

t

Defendant/Respondent.

:

Priority No. 13

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the court of appeals' summary dismissal of the

State's appeal which challenged the magistrate's refusal to
bindover and his dismissal of the information effectively deny
the State any avenue for review of the magistrate's actions, a
result in conflict with the State's historical right to seek
review of a dismissed information and in conflict with the
decisions of every jurisdiction which has addressed the issue?
Did the court of appeals effectively decide an important issue of
state law which has not, but should be, settled by this Court,
that is: What is the appropriate method for review of a
magistrate's order dismissing an information when refiling of the
information is precluded under State v. Brickev, 714 P.2d 644,
647 (Utah 1986)?
2.

Did the court of appeals erroneously conclude that

State v, Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991), holding that a
defendant is entitled to district court review of a bindover
order, addressed and controlled the issue of the State's right to

seek review of a refusal to bindover and dismissal of an
information?
3.

Did the court of appeals' summary dismissal of the

State's appeal fail to determine an important issue of state law
which has not, but should be, settled by this Court, that is:
Under the prima facie standard applicable to preliminary
hearings, is probable cause established as a matter of law when
the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
information, creates issues of fact and credibility to be
resolved by a jury?
4.

Did the court of appeals' use of a per curiam

unpublished summary disposition opinion to address the State's
right to seek review of a magistrate's refusal to bindover and
dismissal of an information, an issue of first impression under
Utah's current statutory and rules scheme, "so far depart from
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings" as to call
for an exercise of this Court's power of supervision?
OPINION BELOW
The court of appeals' opinion sought to be reviewed is
State v. Donald L. Jaeger, No. 910132-CA (Utah App. January 7,
1992), which amended the original opinion issued on January 3,
1992 (copies of the opinions are attached to the addendum).
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
On January 3, 1992, the court of appeals issued its
original unpublished opinion which summarily dismissed the
State's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
2

That opinion was

amended on January 7, 1992. A stay of remittitur was issued.
The state was granted extension of time, up to and including
March 17, 1992, in which to file the present petition.

This

Court has jurisdiction to consider the petition pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(a) and 78-2a-4 (1992).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The text of any constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules relied upon is set forth in the addendum to this petition.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with murder in the second degree,
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann* § 76-5-203
(1990) (R. 1). A preliminary hearing was held in Third Circuit
Court, Salt Lake County, Utah (R. 17-19).

The State's evidence

established that defendant's live-in girlfriend, Mary Branch,
died from a gunshot wound located in her left collar bone area
(T. 37). Based on the location of the wound, the angle of
trajectory of the bullet, the length of the victim's arms, and
the type of weapon, the medical examiner testified that the wound
could not have been self-inflicted (T. 47-66).

The wound was

inflicted from a gun which defendant maintained in the home for
"his own safety" (T. 9, 11, 68). Defendant, the victim, and the
victim's young child were the only persons in the home at the
time of the shooting (T. 10, 67). GSR tests revealed no
gunpowder residue on the victim's hands; defendant's hands
contained substances "characteristic" of gunshot residue (T. 71-

3

72, 89-90).2

At the close of the preliminary hearing, defendant

moved to dismiss the information for lack of probable cause.

The

motion was taken under advisement (R. 19).
On February 2, 1991, the magistrate issued a memorandum
decision directing that the information be dismissed on the
ground that the State had failed to establish sufficient probable
cause to bindover defendant for trial (R. 20-38).

On February 6,

1991, the court issued an order discharging defendant and
dismissing the information (R. 39). The State appealed (R. 44).
The parties completed appellate briefing on November
18, 1991. The issues raised were:
(1) Must a magistrate, in determining
probable cause for a bindover, view the
evidence, including any reasonable
inferences, in the light most favorable to
the information; and, is probable cause
established as a matter of law if the
evidence, when so viewed, creates issues of
fact and credibility to be resolved by a
jury?;
(2) Applying the proper standards of review,
were the magistrate's factual findings
clearly erroneous and his legal conclusion
that no probable cause existed in error?; and
(3) What is the proper avenue for review of
a refusal to bindover and dismissal of an
information when the refiling of the
information is precluded under State v.
Brickev, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986)?
Oral argument was set for January 23, 1992.
On December 18, 1991, this Court issued its opinion in
1

The State's opening and reply briefs contained detailed
statements of facts. Since an evaluation of that evidence is not
necessary to determine if this petition should be granted, the
facts are only briefly summarized here.
4

State v. Humphrey, 823 P. 2d 464 (Utah 1991), which reversed State
v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496 (Utah App. 1990).

Since the parties

had cited to the latter opinion in addressing defendant's
jurisdictional argument, defendant immediately moved, with the
stipulation of the State, for supplemental briefing to assess the
"impact of the Utah Supreme Court decision" on the jurisdictional
issue (Motion and Stipulation for Supplemental Briefing, dated
December 20, 1991).

The parties further stipulated that the

scheduled oral argument should be stricken and reset to
facilitate the necessary supplemental briefing.
On January 3, 1992, the court of appeals summarily
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The per curiam

unpublished opinion contained no discussion of the issues raised
except to conclude, without explanation, that Humphrey and rule
12(b)(1), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, mandated district
court review of a refusal to bindover and related dismissal of
the information.

State v. Jaeger, slip op. at 1-2.

Based on

this erroneous assumption, the court of appeals remanded the case
to the district court.

Id. at 2.

Four days later, the court of

appeals modified its decision by remanding the case to the
circuit court.

Jaeger, amended slip op. at 2.

The opinion was

otherwise unchanged.
Because there presently exists no "new evidence or
changed circumstances" to justify a refiling of the homicide
information against defendant, the State is effectively precluded
from seeking review, at any level, of the magistrate's refusal to

5

bindover and his dismissal of the information.

As will be

presented in the argument of this petition, this is a result
found to be unacceptable by every jurisdiction which has
addressed the issue.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BY SUMMARILY DISMISSING THE STATE'S APPEAL
CHALLENGING THE MAGISTRATE'S REFUSAL TO
BINDOVER AND DISMISSAL OF THE INFORMATION,
THE COURT OF APPEALS EFFECTIVELY DENIED THE
STATE ANY AVENUE OF REVIEW OF THE
MAGISTRATE'S ACTIONS; THIS COURT SHOULD NOW
DETERMINE WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE METHOD OF
REVIEW OF AN ORDER DISMISSING AN INFORMATION
WHEN REFILING OF THE INFORMATION IS PRECLUDED
BY STATE V. BRICKEY.
The court of appeals' summary dismissal of the State's
appeal which challenged the magistrate's refusal to bindover
defendant and his dismissal of the information has effectively
precluded any review of the magistrate's actions in this case.
The court of appeals has denied appellate review; district court
review is not procedurally available since no bindover order was
issued; and the information may not be refiled in circuit court
due to the limitations of State v. Brickev, 714 P.2d 644, 647
(Utah 1986).2

Unless certiorari is granted, the magistrate's

erroneous ruling that no probable cause exists in support of the
information will remain insulated from judicial correction.

This

is a result not contemplated by the legislature nor sanctioned by
2

Once dismissed, an information may only be refiled if the
prosecutor establishes that "new or previously unavailable
evidence has surfaced or that other good cause justifies
refiling." State v. Brickev, 714 P.2d at 647.

6

any other jurisdiction which has addressed the issue.
While the State's right to appeal is restricted by
statute, State v. Kelbach, 569 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Utah 1977), Utah
prosecutors have consistently been provided with some method of
review of dismissed informations in criminal cases.

United

States v. Eldredae, 13 P. 673 (Utah), cert, denied, 145 U.S. 636
(1887) (recognizing territorial government's right to appeal from
demurred information); State v. Amador, 804 P.2d 1233, 1235 (Utah
App. 1990) (discussing state's traditional right to appeal from a
quashed information and the statutory expansion to include any
final judgment of dismissal);

Utah Code Ann. § 77-39r4(l) (1978)

(permitting the state to directly appeal from a "judgment of
dismissal in favor of the defendant upon a motion to quash the
information or indictment"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-26(c)(1)
(1980) (permitting the state to directly appeal from any "final
judgment of dismissal"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(2)(a) (Supp.
1991) (permitting the state to directly appeal from a "final
judgment of dismissal"); and Rule 7, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure (allowing unrestricted refiling of dismissed
informations).
Prior to 1980, the State was permitted to directly
appeal "a judgment of dismissal in favor of the defendant upon a
motion to quash or dismiss the information."
77-39-4.

Utah Code Ann. §

This review was never defined as being restricted to

district court orders.

However, as a practical matter, it was so

restricted because an information could only be filed in district
7

court after a magistrate had found probable cause to justify
holding a defendant on the initial complaint.3
In 1980, Utah adopted a procedure whereby charges were
initiated by information.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-3(3) (1980).

With this change, rule 7, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, was
amended to enlarge the powers of the magistrates beyond
discharging a defendant to include dismissal of the information.
Contemporaneously, the State was given express and unrestricted
authority to refile an information dismissed by a magistrate.
Utah R. Crim. P. 7(d)(1) (1980).

The State's right to appeal was

also expanded beyond the traditional concept of appealing from a
quashed information to now include the right to appeal from any
"final judgment of dismissal."

Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-26.

Accord State v. Amador, 804 P.2d at 1235.
With the creation of the Utah Court of Appeals, the
rules governing the State's right to appeal or to refile a
dismissed information remained substantively the same, while new
rules emerged to differentiate the jurisdictions of the appellate
courts.

Utah R. Crim. P. 7(8)(c) (1991); Utah Code Ann. § 77-

18a-l(2) (Supp. 1991).

The court of appeals was granted

appellate jurisdiction over "appeals from the circuit courts,"

3

Until 1980, criminal charges in Utah were initiated by
complaint. Under this system, a magistrate simply discharged the
defendant if no probable cause was found to support a bindover.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-7 (1978). If probable cause was found,
the defendant was ordered "held to answer to the same." Utah
Code Ann. § 77-15-9(1) (1978). Prosecution could then proceed in
district court on an information.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-10-3
(1978).

8

while this Court retained jurisdiction over appeals from "orders,
judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction."
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(j) and 78-2a-3(2)(d) (Supp. 1991).
From these changes, the current issue emerges. Are
magistrates acting in their traditional non-adjudicative function
when they dismiss informations; or, have their powers been
expanded to those of an adjudicator in quashing an information?
If the latter, should such orders be viewed as magistrate's
orders or as orders of the court of record from which they issue?
Further, if appellate review is not appropriate, under what
circumstances, is the State entitled to seek review?

While

these issues may be raised in light of dicta in State v.
Humphrey, 823 P.2d 465, 467-68 (Utah 1991), that a magistrate's
order is not equivalent to a final judgment of a court of record,
this Court has not directly determined the scope or nature of the
State's right to seek review of a magistrate's order of
dismissal.4

(See Point II, for discussion of the scope of the

Humphrey decision.)
Critical to the ultimate determination of the State's
right, is the issue of the impact of Brickey on a magistrate's

4

The State recognizes the complexity of determining the
nature and scope of the State's right to seek in review in light
of Utah's current statutory and rule scheme, the legislative
intent behind any conflicting provisions, and the proper judicial
characterization of magistrates. This petition does not attempt
to fully present or resolve these issues, but is limited to
demonstrating why this unsettled question should be determined by
this Court.

9

refusal to bindover:

Does Brickey convert what might otherwise

be considered an interim order into a final judgment of
dismissal?

Do the due process limitations of Brickev nullify the

judicial review contemplated by rule 7, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, such that some other method of review is necessary to
preserve the State's historical right to seek correction of an
erroneously dismissed information?

As noted by at least one

commentator, to refuse to provide appellate review because of
lack of "finality" of a judgment, which judgment fully precludes
the State from proceeding, amounts to the "awkward and
unjustified setoff of two irrational rules,"

Graham and Letwin,

"The Preliminary Hearing in Los Angeles: Some Field Findings and
Legal Policy Observations," 18 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 635, 731 (1971).
Indeed, every jurisdiction which has addressed the
prosecution's right to seek review of a refusal to bindover and
dismissal of an information has considered the presence or
absence of a Brickey-type restriction.

State v. Fry, 385 N.W.2d

196, 198-99 (Wis. App. 1985) (where refiling is subject to a
Brickev-type standard, the state retains the right to appeal
erroneous legal conclusion); State v. Antes. 246 N.W.2d 671, 674
(Wis. 1976) (when prosecution is restricted from refiling under
Brickey-type standard, any dismissal of the charges is a final
order and appealable); Commonwealth v. Finn, 496 A.2d 1254, 1255
(Pa. Sup. 1985) (while a dismissal of an information for lack of
probable cause is not ordinarily considered a final order since
the prosecution may freely refile, it will be considered as final
10

and appealable where refiling is precluded due to a statute of
limitations); Commonwealth v. Prado, 393 A.2d 8, 10 (Penn. 1978)
(a dismissal of an information for lack of probable cause will be
considered final where lower court had refused to allow
refiling); Walker v. Schneider, 477 N.W.2d 167, 171-75 (N.D.
1991) (under its writ and rulemaking powers, the court adopts a
Brickev standard and then construes the dismissal of information
as a final order which may be appealed); State Ex Rel. Fallis v.
Caldwell, 498 P.2d 426, 428 (Okl. App. 1972) (using its writ
powers, the court adopts a prospective rule that the prosecution
is entitled to a right of review of a dismissed information coequal with that of defendant's right to review of bindover
order); State v. Zimmerman, 660 P.2d 960, 963-64 (Kan. 1983)
(where refiling is restricted, dismissal of a criminal complaint
is equivalent to a final order; statue permits appeals from such
orders and is not effected by the possibility that the State may
refile); Morgan v. State, 675 P.2d 473 (Okl. App. 1984) (State's
right to refile or appeal from dismissal are alternative modes of
procedure); People v. Nevitt, 256 N.W.2d 612 (Mich. App. 1977)
(where charges are dismissed, better practice is to allow appeal
rather than permit de novo refiling); State v. Ruiz, 678 P.2d
1109, 1110 (Idaho 1984) (where no Brickey-type restriction on
refiling, the State's remedy for a dismissed information is to
refile de novo before a different magistrate); State v. Fahev,
275 N.W.2d 870, 871 (S.D. 1979) (magistrate's order of dismissal
is not final order where State has unrestricted right to refile

11

811 (Minn. 1971) (State's right to review of dismissed charges is
limited to its unrestricted right to refile the charges de novo
before a different magistrate). See also People v. Mimms, 204
Cal.App.3d 471f 251 Cal.Rptr. 672 (Cal. App. 1988) (recognizing
appellate courts attempts to provide review to state of
magistrate's order and subsequent legislative reform allowing the
prosecution to first seek reconsideration from the magistrate who
dismisses an information and then permitting direct appellate
review of the magistrate's refusal to reconsider);
The determination of the nature and scope of the
State's right to seek review of a magistrate's refusal to
bindover and dismissal of the information presents an important
question of state law which has not, but should be, settled by
this Court.

Utah R. App. P. 46(d).

Even when other

jurisdictions have found no direct appellate jurisdiction, the
courts have utilized their inherent writ and rulemaking powers to
resolve the issue.

People v. District Court, 803 P.2d 193 (Colo.

1990) (writ power of supreme court may be used to show cause why
charges should not be reinstated); Commonwealth v. Prado, 393
A.2d at 10 (appeal review is appropriate where no other judicial
review is available).

Similarly, this Court should grant

certiorari to determine this question which is of significance to
both the prosecution and defense.

12

POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED
THAT STATE V, HUMPHREY RULED ON THE SCOPE AND
NATURE OF THE STATE'S RIGHT TO SEEK REVIEW OF
A REFUSAL TO BINDOVER AND DISMISSAL OF AN
INFORMATION.
In summarily dismissing the State's appeal, the court
of appeals erroneously concluded that State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d
at 464, both addressed and determined the nature of the State's
right to seek review of a magistrate's refusal to bindover and
dismissal of an information.

The court of appeals' overly broad

reading of Humphrey to mandate dismissal of this case is in
conflict with the expressed limited holding of Humphrey and
effectively determines, without analysis, an issue of state law
which has not been, but should be, settled by this Court.

Utah

R. App. P. 46(c), 46(d).
The only issue in Humphrey was "whether, in light of
recent statutory and constitutional changes associated with the
creation of the Utah Court of Appeals, the district courts no
longer have jurisdiction to quash bindover orders."
823 P.2d at 465.

Humphrey,

In holding that the district courts had

inherently retained such jurisdiction, this Court expressly
reserved the question of whether a quashal of a bindover order is
equivalent to a dismissal of an information and failed to
otherwise directly consider the ramifications of a quashed or
dismissed information.

This Court held only that when a

defendant is bound over to district court, "the district court's
authority to review defective informations includes the authority
13

to review defective bindover orders•M

JEd. at 466, n.3.

While the court of appeals correctly recited this
limited holding, the court failed to otherwise offer any basis
for its conclusion that Humphrey compelled the dismissal of this
case.

By expanding Humphrey's narrow holding without analysis or

explanation, the court of appeals rendered an opinion which is
implicitly in conflict with this Court's acknowledgment of its
own limited ruling.
Assuming arguendo that the court of appeals found some
other basis in Humphrey for its decision, the court failed to
offer any indication of its reasoning.

While this Court's dicta

in Humphrey may raise arguable issues when applied to the State's
right to judicial review of a magistrate's actions, those issues
are not capable of being summarily decided.

State v. Gardiner,

814 P.2d 568, 572 (Utah 1991) (dicta has no precedent value and
is not controlling).

Accord Humphrey, 823 P.2d at 468

(earlier

dicta is not controlling).
Yet, the court of appeals, with only perfunctory
consideration of Humphrey, simply assumed that the State's right
to review was identical to that of the defendant.

While this

Court may ultimately incorporate the dicta in Humphrey to limit
the State's right to seek appellate review of a refusal to
bindover and dismissal of an information, the issue is
significant and deserves thoughtful analysis in a published
opinion.

In this manner, proper consideration would be given to

the State's historical right to judicial review of dismissed
14

and/or quashed informations, the impact of any rule and statutory
modifications on that right, the legislative intent behind any
presently conflicting statutory provisions, and the significant
variances between the procedure governing a bindover which
invokes jurisdiction and a refusal to bindover which effectively
revokes jurisdiction.
Unless this Court accepts certiorari, this important
question of state law will remain unresolved*
46(d).

Utah R. App, P.

For while the State has been denied any right to seek

review of the magistrate's actions in this case, the unpublished
ruling provides no precedent value to future litigants.
POINT III
IN ADDITION TO THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE, THIS
CASE PRESENTS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE OF STATE LAW
WHICH HAS NOT, BUT SHOULD BE, SETTLED BY THIS
COURT, THAT IS: IS PROBABLE CAUSE TO
BINDOVER ESTABLISHED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN
THE EVIDENCE, VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST
FAVORABLE TO THE INFORMATION, CREATES ISSUES
OF FACT AND CREDIBILITY TO BE RESOLVED BY A
JURY?
Because the court of appeals summarily dismissed the
State's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, the court never
addressed the substantive issues raised by the parties, that is:
Under the prima facie standard applicable to preliminary
hearings, must the evidence be viewed in the light most favorable
to supporting the information; and, when so viewed, is the
evidence sufficient to establish probable cause, as a matter of
law, when it creates issues of fact and credibility to be
resolved by a jury?

While it is firmly established that the
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evidence at a preliminary hearing must "establish a prima facie
case against the defendant from which the trier of fact could
conclude the defendant was guilty of the offense charged," State
v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783 (Utah 1980), no Utah case has
ruled on the specific parameters of how a magistrate should
evaluate the evidence to determine if a prima facie case has been
established.
It is clear that for trial purposes, courts should not
weigh conflicting evidence in addressing the appropriateness of
dismissals based on insufficient evidence and directed verdicts.
Rather, the court must consider the evidence
in the light most favorable to the party
against whom the motion is directed and
resolve controverted facts in his favor. If
the evidence and its inferences would cause
reasonable men to arrive at different
conclusions as to whether the essential facts
were or were not proved, then the question is
one of fact for the jury. Unless the
evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of
reasonable inference to prove some issue
which supports the plaintiff's claim, a court
should not direct a verdict for the
defendant.
Cruz v. Montova, 660 P.2d 723, 728-29 (Utah 1983) (citations
omitted).
Following this same standard, other jurisdictions have
concluded that under the prima facie/directed verdict standard,5
a preliminary hearing court is mandated to view the evidence, and
all reasonable inferences, in the light most favorable to the

5

In the preliminary hearing context, these terms are
treated synonymously. LaFave and Israel, Criminal Procedure, §
14.3(a).
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prosecution, and then determine if some evidence exists in
support of all requisite elements of the crime.

If credible

evidence exists both supporting and negating an element, this
presents a question of fact to be resolved by the jury and a
bindover is required.

People v. Superior Court (KneipU 268

Cal.Rptr. 1, 3 (Cal. Ct. App. 6 Dist. 1990); People v. Superior
Court fBouldenK 257 Cal.Rptr. 678, 680 (Calif. Ct. App. 1st
Dist. 1989); People v. District Court, 803 P.2d 193, 196 (Colo.
1990); People v. Garner, 781 P.2d 87, 90 (Colo. 1989); People v.
Pedrie, 727 P.2d 859, 862 (Colo. 1986); State v. Patterson, 570
A.2d 174, 179 (Conn. 1990) People v. Moore, 446 N.W.2d 834, 838
(Mich. Ct. App. 1989), appeal denied

Mich.

(1990); Matter

of Buckner, 284 N.W.2d 507, 509 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979); State ex
rel. Funmaker v. Klamm, 317 N.W.2d 458, 461 (Wis. 1982).
The determination of the proper standard to be applied
in evaluating the evidence at a preliminary hearing also requires
definition of the magistrate's role in considering credibility.
While this Court in State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d at 786, gave
tacit approval to a committing magistrate making some initial
determinations of credibility, it did not address the issue of
how such a requirement blends with the recognition that a
preliminary hearing cannot determine ultimate issues of
culpability.

Other courts have concluded that "a judge in a

preliminary hearing has jurisdiction to consider the credibility
of witnesses only when, as a matter of law, the testimony is
implausible or incredible."

Hunter v. District Court, 543 P.2d
17

1265, 1268 (Colo. 1975).

Accord People in Interest of M.V., 742

P.2d 326, 329 (Colo. 1987); Matter of Buckner, 284 N.W.2d at 509;
State ex rel. Funmaker v. Klamm, 317 N.W.2d at 461.
If certiorari review is permitted on the jurisdictional
question, review should also be granted on this substantive issue
which has not, but should be, decided by this Court.
App. P. 46(d).

Utah R.

Regardless of the type of review permissible from

a magistrate's order, the bar and trial bench would benefit from
this Court's direction as to how evidence in support of probable
cause should be evaluated.
POINT IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS WHEN IT SUMMARILY DISMISSED THE
STATE'S APPEAL THAT THIS COURT SHOULD
EXERCISE ITS POWER OF SUPERVISION BY
ACCEPTING REVIEW OF THE MATTER.
As discussed, this appeal presented two issues of first
impression in Utah.

First, what method of review is appropriate

for an order of dismissal of an information where no refiling of
the information would be permitted under State v. Brickev?
Second, under the prima facie standard, is probable cause
established as a matter of law when the evidence, viewed in the
light most favorable to the information, creates issue of fact
and credibility to be resolved by a jury?

Both parties

diligently briefed these issues; neither party argued that any
Utah case had directly resolved the issues.
Despite this, the court of appeals, without notice to
the parties that it was considering summary disposition, issued
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its unpublished per curiam opinion dismissing the appeal.

The

court then struck oral argument and ruled that the issue of
supplemental briefing was "moot."

Jaeger, amended slip op. at 2.

Four days later, the court issued its amended opinion.
While the court of appeals has the inherent right to
dispose of any case before it without full briefing and without
oral argument, it is clear that rule 10, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, contemplates that summary reversal of a case should
only be invoked when the parties have had an opportunity to
respond to such a drastic procedure.

(See Utah R. App. P. 10(a)-

(c), requiring notice and an opportunity to respond w£en a party
moves for summary disposition and allowing reversal only for
manifest error.)
Nor can the implications of rule 10 be ignored because
this appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

In the case

of most dismissals for lack of jurisdiction, the issue is
determined by a simple review of the record.

Yet, even in those

cases, the practice of the court of appeals is to give notice
that summary disposition is being considered and then to grant
the parties an opportunity to respond.

Just as this Court

recognized in issuing a reasoned published opinion in Humphrey,
even when a court finds that it does not have jurisdiction, that
determination, when one of first impression, deserves full
appellate consideration due to its severe ramifications.

Accord

State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 570, n.l.
In failing to permit the parties an opportunity to
fully brief the jurisdictional issue in light of intervening case
19

without notice or opportunity for the parties to respond, and in
issuing an unpublished per curiam opinion to decide an issue of
first impression, the court of appeals substantially departed
from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings.

This

Court should exercise its power of supervision and grant
certiorari to review the appropriateness of the court of appeals'
actions.

Utah R. App. P. 46(c).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully

requests that this Court grant the petition for writ of
certiorari.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / T ^ d a y of March, 1992.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney Gener^l^^
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of
the foregoing petition for writ of certiorari was mailed, postage
prepaid, to

Joan C. Watt, attorney for respondent, Salt Lake

Legal Defender Assoc, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake
City, Utah

84111, this

of March,^1992.
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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

AMENDED*
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Publication)

v.
Case No. 910132-CA
Donald L. Jaeger,
Defendant and Appellee.

F I L E D
(January 7, 1992)

Third Circuit, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Michael L. Hutchings
Attorneys:

R. Paul Van Dam and Christine F. Soltisf Salt Lake
City, for Appellant
Joan C. Watt, Lisa J. Remal, and Richard P. Mauro,
Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Russon, Bench, and Greenwood (Law & Motion).
PER CURIAM:
This matter is before the court on appellee's motion and
stipulation for supplemental briefing and to strike oral
argument.
Defendant was charged with second degree murder and a
preliminary hearing was held. The court dismissed the
information on the ground that the State failed to establish

probable
trial.

cause to bind over defendant

to district

court

for

The State appeals.

In State v. Humphrey. No. 900434 (Utah December 18, 1991),
the Utah Supreme Court held that jurisdiction to review bindover
orders rests with the district court, not with the Utah Court of
Appeals. The court stated that when a bindover order is issued,
the circuit court judge, acting as a magistrate, determines
whether there is sufficient evidence to bind defendant over for
trial. If so, the information is then transferred to the
*This replaces the memorandum decision issued on January 3, 1992.

district court permitting that court to take original
jurisdiction of the matter- The district court then "has the
inherent authority and the obligation to determine whether its
original jurisdiction has been properly invoked." .Id. Further,
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure gives the
district courts authority to review defects in the indictment or
information.
In this case, the State appeals from the circuit court's
dismissal of an information, alleging defendant should have been
bound over to district court for trial. In accordance with
Humphrey. we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and
remand to the circuit court. Because we dismiss the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction, oral argument is stricken and the motion
for supplemental briefing is deemed moot.

Leonard H. Russon, Judge

Russel^-W. Bench, Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
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ourt
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MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No- 910132-CA

v.
Donald L. Jaeger,
Defendant and Appellee.

F I L E D
(January 3, 1992)

Third Circuit, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Michael L. Hutchings
Attorneys:

R. Paul Van Dam and Christine F. Soltis, Salt Lake
City, for Appellant
Joan C. Watt, Lisa J, Remal, and Richard P. Mauro,
Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Russon, Bench, and Greenwood (Law & Motion).
PER CURIAM:
This matter is before the court on appellee's motion and
stipulation for supplemental briefing and to strike oral
argument•
Defendant was charged with second degree murder and a
preliminary hearing was held. The court dismissed the
information on the ground that the State failed to establish
probable cause to bind over defendant to district court for
trial. The State appeals.
In State v. Humphrey, No. 900434 (Utah December 18, 1991),
the Utah Supreme Court held that jurisdiction to review bindover
orders rests with the district court, not with the Utah Court of
Appeals. The court stated that when a bindover order is issued,
the circuit court judge, acting as a magistrate, determines
whether there is sufficient evidence to bind defendant over for
trial. If so, the information is then transferred to the
district court permitting that court to take original
jurisdiction of the matter. The district court then "has the
inherent authority and the obligation to determine whether its
original jurisdiction has been properly invoked." id. Further,

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure gives the
district courts authority to review defects in the indictment or
information.
In this case, the State appeals from the circuit court's
dismissal of an information, alleging defendant should have been
bound over to district court for trial. In accordance with
Humphrey. we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and
remand to the district court. Because we dismiss the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction, oral argument is stricken and the motion
for supplemental beefing is deemed moot.

Leopard H. Russon, Judge

Russe^J^W. Bench, Judge^
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Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
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CURRENT PROVISIONS

Rule 7. Proceedings before magistrate.

(8) (a) A preliminary examination shall be held under the rules and laws
applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The state has the burden
of proof and shall proceed first with its case. At the conclusion of the
state's case, the defendant may testify under oath, call witnesses, and
present evidence. The defendant may also cross-examine the witnesses
against him.
(b) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe
that the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has
committed it, the magistrate shall order, in writing, that the defendant be
bound over to answer in the district court. Thefindingsof probable cause
may be based on hearsay in whole or in part. Objections to evidence on
the ground that it was acquired by unlawful means are not properly
raised at the preliminary examination.
(c) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the
crime charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it,
the magistrate shall dismiss the informatior and discharge the defendant. The magistrate may enterfindingsof fact, conclusions of law, and
an order of dismissal. The dismissal and discharge do not preclude the
state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.

77-18a-l. Appeals — When proper.
(1) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from:
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea;
(b) an order made after judgment that affects the substantial rights of
the defendant;
(c) an interlocutory order when upon petition for review the appellate
court decides the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution.
(2) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from:
(a) a final judgment of dismissal;
(b) an order arresting judgment;
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of afindingof double
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial;
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part of it invalid;
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evidence when upon a petition for review the appellate court decides that the
appeal would be in the interest of justice; or
(f) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty
or no contest.

1980 PROVISIONS

77-1-3. Definitions—Peace officer classifications.—For the purpose of
this act:
.
,
(1) "Criminal action" means the proceedings by which a person is charged,
accused and brought to trial for a public offense;
(2) "Indictment" means an accusation, in writing, presented by a grand
jury to the district court, charging a person with a public offense;
(3) "Information" means an accusation, in writing, charging a person with a
public offense which is presented and signed by a prosecuting attorney and
filed in the office of the clerk where the prosecution is commenced or subscribed and sworn to by a complaining witness before a magistrate if the
offense is a class B misdemeanor or a lesser offense not requiring approval of
the prosecuting attorney;

77-35-26, Rule 26—Appeals.—(a) An appeal is taken by filing with the
clerk of the courtfromwhich the appeal is taken a notice of appeal stating the
order or judgment appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the
adverse party or his attorney of record. Proof of service of such copy shall be
filed with the court.
(b) An appeal may be taken by the defendant:
(1) From the final judgment of conviction;
(2) From an order made, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of
the defendant;
(3) From an interlocutory order when, upon petition for review, the supreme court decides that such an appeal would be in the interest of justice; or
(4) From any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental disease or defect, incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution.
(c) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution:
(1) From afinaljudgment of dismissal;
(2) From an order arresting judgment;
(3) From an order terminating the prosecution because of afindingof double jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial;
(4) From a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part thereof
invalid; or
(5) From an order of the court granting a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence when, upon a petition for review, the supreme court decides that such
an appeal would be in the interest of justice.

1980 PROVISIONS

77-35-7. Rule 7—Proceeding v*fore magistrate.

(c) If a defendant is charged with a felony, he shall not be called on to plead
before the committing magistrate. During the initial appearance before the
magistrate, the defendant shall be advised of his right to a preliminary examination. If the defendant waives his right to a preliminary examination, and
the prosecuting attorney consent . the magistrate shall forthwith order the
defendant bound over to answer L* the district court. If the defendant does
not waive a preliminary examination, the magistrate shall schedule the preliminary examination. Such examination shall be held within a reasonable
time, but in any event not later than ten days if the defendant is in custody
for the offense charged and not later than 30 days if Ke is not in custody;
provided, however, that these time periods may be extended by the magistrate for good cause shown. A preliminary examination shall not be held if the
defendant is indicted.
(d) (1) A preliminary examination shall be held in accordance with the
rules and laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The state
shall have the burden of proof and be required to proceed first with its case.
At the conclusion of the state's case, the defendant may testify under oath,
call witnesses, and present evidence. The defendant may also cross-examine
the witnesses against him. If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable
cause to believe that the crime charged has been committed and that the
defendant has committed it, the magistrate shall forthwith order, in writing,
that the defendant be bound over to answer in the district court. The findings
of probable cause may be based on hearsay in whole or in part. Objections to
evidence on the ground that it was acquired by unlawful means are not properly raised at the preliminary examination. If the magistrate does not find
probable cause to believe that the crime charged has been committed or that
the defendant committed it, the magistrate shall dismiss the information and
discharge the defendant. The magistrate may enter findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order of dismissal. The dismissal and discharge shall not
preclude the state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same
offense.

1978 PROVISIONS

77-10-3. 'Information" defined.—An information is an accusation in
writing in form and substance like an indictment for the same offense, charging a person with a public offense, presented and signed by the district attorney, or by the attorney pro tempore for the state, and filed in the office
of the clerk of the district court.

77-15-7. Form of commitment.—The commitment for examination shall
be made by an indorsement, signed by the magistrate on the warrant of
arrest, to the following effect. "The within named A B, having been
brought before me under this warrant is committed for examination to
the sheriff of
— " If the sheriff is not present, the defendant may
be committed to the custody of any peace officer.

77-15-9. Procedure on preliminary examination.—At the examination
the magistrate must first read to the defendant the complaint and the
depositions of the witnesses examined or making the complaint, if depositions were taken.

77-39-4. Appeal by state, in what cases.—An appeal may be taken
by the state:
(1) From a judgment of dismissal in favor of the defendant upon
a motion to quash the information or indictment.
(2) From an order arresting judgment.
(3) From an order made after judgment affecting the substantial
rights of the state.
(4) From an order of the court directing the jury to find for the
defendant.

